

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

b: [] Taper

Iden A - []
Iden B - []
Iden C - []

Idens A & B have
no pseudos.

Yours are to appreciate:

9/25/18

Good reports, if
inconclusive

Agree + concern []
[]

ROUGH DRAFT - DISPATCH TO HQ.

TO: PBSUCCESS HQ

FROM: LINCOLN

SUBJECT: GENERAL: SECURITY

SPECIFIC: ERRONEOUS TRANSMISSION TAPES TO SHERWOOD

1. Per Cable #067 from Sherwood to Lincoln dated 14 May 1954, Lincoln received information that four (4) tapes marked "interview with []" *had been received with the regular & tape* recorded at ~~a~~ a "3 and 3/4 speed" and requested instructions on their use. Per Lincoln 2686, 14 May 1954, Sherwood was instructed to destroy these four tapes immediately and the destruction was ~~was~~ confirmed per Sherwood 070 dated 15 May 1954.


2. The four tapes in question were immediately recognized as being an operational ~~de~~briefing of a prospective "K" program agent by GRAHAM L. PAGE which was conducted at Headquarters in April 1954. These tapes were brought to Lincoln by PAGE and had been kept in PAGE's safe in Room 34 at Lincoln.

3. Immediately upon notification, an inquiry was initiated to ascertain the facts concerning this incident and to resolve the question as to whether such misdirection was intentional or an error attributable to ~~the~~ expediency ~~attendant~~ in the course of a highly urgent matter. Extensive interviews were conducted with all Lincoln personnel having any knowledge or access to the tapes in question.

4. It was ascertained that on the afternoon of 12 May 1954, PAUL D. LANGEVIN brought twelve boxes of tapes from Safehouse "D" to Lincoln. The boxes were numbered consecutively from forty-five (45) through fifty-six (56). These twelve boxes of tapes were given to ANDREW F. MERTON who would make the necessary arrangements for their transmission to Sherwood. MERTON advises that he kept these tapes, which were not wrapped, on his desk from approximately ¹²⁰⁰ ~~1500~~ on 12 May until ~~approximately~~.

approximately 1600 on the same date at which time he delivered them, still unwrapped, to MALCOLM H. ~~BROADFROST~~ BROADFROST ~~in~~ in Room 31. MERTON states that he had checked on the number of tapes ~~and~~ a number of times and is sure that he delivered only twelve boxes of tapes numbered forty-five (45) through fifty-six (56) to BROADFROST. BROADFROST remembers receiving the tapes on the afternoon of 12 May, but states he did not count them. He believes that upon delivery by MERTON, MERTON mentioned that these were the twelve boxes of tapes which were to be furnished to Iden C at 0800 on 13 May for transmission to FJHOPEFUL and thence to SHERWOOD. BROADFROST left the tapes on his desk and was in and out of office a number of times during the course of the evening. At approximately 2030 on 12 May, BROADFROST returned to his office and noted that the tapes were on his desk. He then wrote a note to MERTON, who was out of the office, but expected back that evening, and gave it to his secretary, Iden A. In his note to MERTON, BROADFROST requested that MERTON take care of delivery of the tapes to Iden C due to the fact that operational activities would require BROADFROST's presence at a hotel ~~in Miami Beach~~ where, for security reasons, he was to place a long distance phone call. BROADFROST completed the writing of this note in the presence of Iden A and gave it to her with instruction to give it to ~~MERTON~~ MERTON on his return. ~~Iden A~~ Iden A accepted the note, but is unable to recall the contents of the note nor can she recall whether or not she remembers seeing the tapes on BROADFROST's desk.

5. Iden A left the office shortly after BROADFROST departed, but did not, at that time, put BROADFROST's workpapers in the safe. Iden A, together with JEROME B. DUNBAR and WILLIAM D. PLAYDON, left the office at approximately 2045 and proceeded to a nearby restaurant for dinner. They returned to the office at approximately 0030 ~~XX~~ on 13 May. ~~At approximately 0100 on 13 May,~~ At approximately 0100 on 13 May, Iden A, accompanied by Iden B, proceeded to check BROADFROST's desk and find ~~the~~

safe
all material in the ~~file~~ drawer assigned to him. ~~which~~ The drawer is the second from the bottom ~~box~~ in a safe located in Room 34. This is the only safe in this room and the office is occupied only by  who was ~~in~~^{at} Headquarters at ~~that~~ the time of the incident.

6. Iden A states that she can not recall whether or not there were tapes on BROADFROST's desk either at ~~2~~ 2030 ~~xxxx~~ on 12 May or at 0100 on 13 May. She does not recall seeing any tapes nor does she recall putting any tapes ~~in~~ away on the dates in question. ~~She is supported by~~ Iden B, who assisted her in clearing BROADFROST's desk, is quite positive in his statement that there were no tapes placed in BROADFROST's safe drawer on the night of 12-13 May by either ~~he~~^{him} or Iden A. BROADFROST keeps his files in a cardboard box container. The size of this box is such ~~at~~ that the presence of twelve boxes of tapes would require careful arrangement to allow closing the drawer. Both Iden A and Iden B recall placing the cardboard box, a paper bag containing a quantity of burn material and other miscellaneous papers in the drawer, but do not recall either putting tapes in the drawer or ~~finding them there~~ seeing them there when the other material was inserted. They both contend that the drawer was empty at the time they inserted BROADFROST's material. The safe was then locked and the security check sheet on the safe was ~~made~~ initialed by Iden A as having locked the safe and Iden B as having made the security check. The time closed was listed as 0110 on 13 May 1954.

7. During the course of the evening, DUNBAR learned that MERTON would not be returning to the office. He then telephonically contacted BROADFROST at the hotel and arrangements were made for BROADFROST to return to the office early on the morning of 13 May and insure the delivery of the tapes to Iden C at 0800.

8. BROADFROST states that he returned to the office at approximately

0650 on 13 May 1954. He states he opened his safe shortly thereafter, although the ~~check sheet~~ security check sheet on the safe does not record this fact, and removed the tapes from his drawer. He states positively that the tapes were located in the second drawer from the bottom of the safe located in Room 34. ~~These tapes were taken from their edges~~ BROADFROST states that there were three stacks of tapes, stacked on edge, between the cardboard box and the side of the file drawer. (Sixteen tapes were taken for demonstration purposes and placed in the drawer together with the cardboard box and it was found that these would fit in the manner described, although such arrangements would require some attention.) BROADFROST then took the tapes out of the drawer and into Room 32 where he wrapped and addressed the tapes in one package. He delivered this package to Iden C at approximately 0800 on 13 May 1954. At no time does BROADFROST recall counting the number of tapes, assuming that they had been counted by MERTON and having no particular reason to check on this point. He can not recall whether there were twelve, sixteen or any other specific ~~of~~ number of tapes ~~wrapped~~ wrapped by him on the morning of 13 May.


9. Inquiry was initiated to determine where the [] tapes were introduced into the picture. It was determined that "three or four" tapes belonging to PAGE and believed to be identical with the ones in question, were by [] ~~placed~~ observed/in the bottom drawer of the safe in Room 34 approximately two weeks prior to the incident. Careful checks with all Lincoln personnel fail to reveal any evidence that such tapes were removed from the safe for any reason.

10. In a manner unresolved, these four [] tapes became mingled with the tapes destined for Sherwood. It must be noted that Iden B was the duty officer on the night of 12-13 May and he attests to the fact that BROADFROST arrived at the office at the time indicated. There were no other persons present in the office except the communications officer and the duty officer from approximately

0200 when DUNBAR and PLAYDON departed until the arrival of the two janitors at 0630. The janitors are kept under observation by the duty officer and they did not go near the safe in question. The first LINCOLN personnel to enter was BROADFROST at approximately 0650. DUNBAR took Iden A home at approximately 0115 on 13 May, returned to the office at approximately 0130 and then departed with PLAYDON at approximately 0200.

11. The statements by Iden A and Iden B that they do not recall seeing the tapes or putting them in BROADFROST's safe drawer and the statement by BROADFROST that he removed them from this same drawer some six hours later, appear to be an error in memory on the part of one of these three individuals. One distinct possibility is that the tapes were placed in the bottom drawer where they could have been mingled with the four boxes of [] tapes. There is a possibility that such co-mingling of tapes was intentionally accomplished, although it is the opinion of the Security Officer of LINCOLN that this is highly improbable. If such an act had been committed intentionally it would seem reasonable to assume that the person involved would have accomplished his task more adroitly by removing four SHERWOOD tapes from their boxes and replacing them with the [] tapes. The addition of an additional four boxes of tapes also would have increased the risk of premature discovery if the act had been intentional, and it is also to be noted that the [] tapes were marked as such on the outside of the boxes.

12. Due to a limited amount of safe drawer space available to LINCOLN employees due to the temporary nature of the project and the close working relationship of the various staffs and their members, the safe in question was used by both the Air Operations Officer and the Chief, FI. For a short period prior to this incident, the bottom drawer of the safe in question was utilized by members of the PM staff. This situation further tends to confuse the issue and make

clarification more difficult, in view of the fact that the  tapes had probably been moved from drawer to drawer on one or more occasions during the past month. It is noteworthy to mention that the ^{bottom}~~pertinent~~ drawer frequently sticks due to a minor mechanical defect, and therefore this drawer is not used as frequently as the other three drawers of the safe. This defective drawer in no way impairs the security of the safe, but ^{it} is difficult to open at times. Knowing that this drawer is frequently difficult to open, it would seem that one of the members of the staff would remember placing the tapes in that drawer if such were the case.

13. During the course of this incident, Graham L. PAGE has been away from LINCOLN; however, he will be questioned concerning this matter upon his return.

14. CONCLUSIONS:

It is the considered opinion of the LINCOLN Security Officer that this incident is not the result of an intentional desire on the part of anyone to disrupt the project. The co-mingling of tapes, while not resolved, appears to be the result of the rather casual handling of this sensitive material on the part of responsible staff employees. This serious incident has been brought to the attention of every staff employee and steps have been taken to insure that a similar incident will not occur in the future. There is a possibility that one of the staff employees may be concealing the truth in order to avoid the embarrassment and responsibility for such a serious error. However, Idens A, B, BROADFROST and HERTON have expressed willingness to take a technical interrogation on this subject if that is deemed necessary. It is the personal opinion of the Security Officer that such drastic action as a technical interrogation of PESUCCESS personnel at this time of the project, without more specific reasons for doing so, would create serious morale factors and possibly a serious decrease in production. It is recommended that upon

completion of interview with Graham L. PAGE, this incident be considered closed unless additional information comes to the attention of this office which would require reopening the matter.